




This is the author’s final version of the work, as accepted for publication  
following peer review but without the publisher’s layout or pagination.  






Reilly, B. (2013) Political parties and post-conflict peacebuilding. Civil 










Copyright: © 2013 Taylor & Francis. 
It is posted here for your personal use. No further distribution is permitted. 
 
 




As key agents of conflict management, political parties should play a critical role in peacebuilding. 
But despite a widespread consensus on the importance of parties for both political and economic 
development, international interventions in post-conflict states often have the effect of undermining, 
rather than promoting, the development of strong parties and stable party systems. While both the 
scholarly literature and much domestic political practice favour the development of aggregative and 
nationally focused parties, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts – particularly cases where 
the United Nations is involved – often privilege descriptive representation and inclusion over other 
goals, resulting in fragmented and ethnically based party systems. This neglect of systemic party-
building has contributed to extreme political sclerosis in recent high-profile international interventions 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Nepal, amongst others. 
As key agents of both political development and conflict management, political parties should play a 
critical role in post-conflict peacebuilding. However, despite a widespread scholarly consensus on the 
importance of programmatic political parties for both political and economic development, I argue in 
this article that contemporary international interventions to promote democracy in post-conflict states 
often have the effect of undermining, rather than promoting, the development of strong parties and 
stable party systems. 
In this article, I pursue three approaches to examining this policy dilemma. First, I take 
an institutional approach, looking at some of the more innovative attempts around the world to try to 
build more aggregative and nationally focused political parties. The distinctive aspect here is that I 
focus not just on post-conflict countries but also on a potentially more important control group – those 
countries which have not become as conflict-prone as many expected, such as Indonesia. 
Second, I utilise some of the most interesting current work coming out of political economy, which 
highlights the role of programmatic political parties as institutions which can help to solve collective 
action problems and deliver credible commitments. Again, these very qualities tend to be in 
particularly short supply in many post-conflict countries. Hence, I argue that the institutional 
economics literature on programmatic parties has great potential relevance for questions of post-
conflict peacebuilding. 
Finally, I turn to the empirical story, looking at international approaches to post-conflict democracy 
and party-building. I argue that the prevailing international practice, particularly in cases where the 
United Nations is heavily involved, tends to prioritise descriptive representation and inclusion over 
other goals such as governability and accountability, resulting in weak, fragmented and often 
ethnically based party systems. This neglect of systemic party-building has contributed to extreme 
political sclerosis in recent high-profile international interventions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Nepal, amongst others. 
 
Introduction 
Political parties are essential components of representative democracy, and it is difficult to imagine 
how the governance of modern states could be accomplished without meaningful political parties. By 
organising voters, aggregating and articulating interests, crafting policy alternatives and providing the 
basis for coordinated electoral and legislative activity, political parties are not just central to 
representative government, but also to the process of democratic development in transitional 
democracies.1.   
Parties perform a number of essential functions that make democracy possible. Ideally, they represent 
political constituencies and interests, recruit and socialise new candidates for office, set policymaking 
agendas, integrate disparate groups and individuals into the democratic process, and form the basis of 
stable political coalitions and hence governments. Collectively, this means that political parties are 
one of the primary avenues for building an accountable and responsive model of democracy. 
Beyond these functional activities, parties also provide a number of deeper, systemic supports that 
help make democracy work effectively. For instance, they mediate between the demands of the 
citizenry and the actions of the government, aggregating the diverse demands of the electorate into 
coherent public policy, and making effective collective action possible within legislatures. Without 
the predictable voting coalitions that parliamentary parties provide, there would be chaos as 
legislative majorities shifted from issue to issue and vote to vote. 
Yet in many countries, particularly post-conflict ones, political parties struggle to play these 
admittedly idealised roles. Instead, parties exhibit a range of pathologies that undercut their ability to 
deliver the kind of systemic benefits on which representative politics depends. In reality, parties in 
transitional environments are often poorly institutionalised or based around narrow personal, regional 
or ethnic ties, rather than reflecting society as a whole. They are typically organisationally thin, 
coming to life only at election time, with little in the way of a coherent ideology or policy agenda. 
They are frequently unable to ensure disciplined collective action in parliament, with members 
shifting between parties. As a result, parties often struggle to manage social conflicts and fail to 
deliver public goods and promote development. 
 
Parties and post-conflict governance 
Political parties' importance is heightened in countries attempting to make the transition from the 
chaos of violent conflict to democratic government. In post-conflict or divided societies, ethnic and 
other communal identities are often a predominant social cleavage, providing a kind of social glue 
when other civic bonds have been destroyed. Those few civil society organisations that exist are often 
closely associated with conflict actors (e.g. ethnic associations, religious bodies, veterans groups, 
etc.), often through direct patron–client exchanges. As a result, politics tends to be both highly 
personalised and strongly identity-based around whatever cleavages – tribe, language, region or 
religion – are most salient. In such cases, the interaction between civil society, political parties and the 
electoral process can become highly fraught, as demonstrated in cases such as Kenya where flawed 
elections catalysed large-scale ethnic violence in 2007.2 
The recognition of such impediments to democratic development has spurred growing attention, both 
at the domestic and international level, on how more broad-based political parties can be sustained 
and developed in socially complex environments. Internationally, the response by Western 
governments to this problem has been a plethora of political party assistance programs which seek to 
help parties become stronger, more coherent and inclusive organisations – that is, more like the 
idealised view of how parties are supposed to operate. These programs have received considerable 
funding from donor agencies and generated a swathe of bodies devoted to political party assistance. 
Post-conflict states such as Mozambique, Kosovo and Afghanistan have been the recipients of large-
scale party-building operations designed to transform former armed groups into electoral 
organisations which respect constitutional boundaries.3. As a result of this increasing focus on parties 
at both the domestic and international level, the importance of political parties to post-conflict 
democracy receives more attention today than ever before.4 
But evaluations suggest that these assistance programs typically have a limited impact, rarely if ever 
transforming the fundamental organisational and operational characteristics of recipient parties.5. The 
indiscriminate way in which assistance is offered and the lack of any overarching consensus on what 
kinds of parties and party systems should be encouraged represents a particular weakness of 
contemporary party assistance. Post-conflict democracy promotion too often becomes hostage to 
facile ideas about the virtues of unconstrained party system development – a policy of ‘let a thousand 
flowers bloom’. While superficially attractive, this has led to a proliferation of new parties in 
transitional democracies, often based around narrow identity criteria, and a dearth of the kind of 
broad-based, aggregative parties that, studies suggest, can bind together societies and promote 
economic development. 
This disjuncture is even more striking, given the way political elites in conflict-prone countries which 
have not attracted international interventions have tended to deal with their own issues of internal 
party system development. In sharp contrast to international dictates, domestic elites frequently seek 
to limit party proliferation, combat sectarianism and regulate the way parties form, organise and 
compete.6. For instance, many emerging democracies attempt to restrict ethnic or religiously based 
parties, up to and including banning them outright.7. Others use formal or informal multiethnic 
coalitions of ethnic parties, such as the Barisan Nasional umbrella in Malaysia which brings together 
separate parties representing the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities.8. Many emerging 
democracies use electoral reforms to shape the development of their party systems, and some have 
also introduced rules governing voting in parliament as well, in an attempt to ensure greater party 
discipline.9 
These efforts to build more coherent, and less fragmented, parties can draw on considerable support 
from the scholarly literature. In his classic work on political change, for example, Samuel Huntington 
argued that strong parties are ‘the prerequisite for political stability in modernising countries’.10. Three 
leading scholars of democracy, Juan Linz, Larry Diamond and Seymour Martin Lipset, bluntly stated 
that ‘without effective parties that command at least somewhat stable bases of support, democracies 
cannot have effective governance’11. Separately, in one of his final publications, Lipset extolled the 
‘indispensability of political parties’ for the survival of both emerging and established democracies.12 
Empirical studies on the relationship between political parties and country governance have buttressed 
these conclusions. The most sophisticated effort, by Kenneth Janda and Jin-Young Kwak, concluded 
that one-third to half of all the variation in governance outcomes between states could be explained by 
how competitive, aggregative and stable was their party system13. Conversely, fragmented party 
systems seem debilitating for good governance: Powell's work on democratic durability suggests that 
the most favourable party system comprised a limited number of cohesive and broad-based parties, 
rather than many small, fragmented, personalised or ethnically based parties.14 
Public goods delivery is a key part of this story, with nationally focussed parties more likely to deliver 
classic public goods such as health services15. Cross-nationally, an increase in the number of parties 
represented in the legislature leads to a higher spending by the government on subsidies and transfers 
but lower spending on public goods.16. A lack of nationalised parties can also be conflict-enhancing. 
According to large-N research by Dawn Brancati, regional parties tend to increase ethnic conflict and 
secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favours certain 
groups over others, and mobilising groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.17 
Broad-based party systems have also been identified as important factors supporting economic reform 
in fragile states. Haggard and Kaufman, for instance, found that ‘the way party systems aggregated 
the preferences of competing economic interests’ had a direct impact on the political economy of 
democratic transitions, noting that while moderate catch-all party systems appeared to facilitate 
preference aggregation, fragmented and polarised party systems constituted a particular barrier to 
reform18. However, this is not an inevitable outcome. European experience illustrates several example 
nations adapting to new realities of party fragmentation by developing accommodative practices.19. 
Where political competition is diffused by multiparty competition across the political spectrum, with 
no central governing or opposition party to structure political choice, citizens and political elites alike 
have to adapt to the reality of fragmenting political interests or face repeated rounds of instability and 
governmental underperformance.20 
Regardless of sheer numbers, the presence of parties that are 
both institutionalised and programmatic seems to be particularly important for democracy work 
effectively, enabling politicians to make credible election promises and electorates to retrospectively 
punish those who fail to deliver.21. By mobilising the aggregate interests of individuals with similar 
preferences, such parties also facilitate collective action – one of the keys to both economic and 
political development, as it allows citizens to act collectively in defence of their joint interests and to 
retrospectively reward or punish governing parties accordingly. Where citizens have this ability, 
governments have greater incentives to pursue public policies in the public interest and also face 
greater political costs if they fail.22 
But while both political practitioners and political scientists agree on the virtues of stable and 
programmatic political parties for emerging and consolidated democracies alike, they offer 
surprisingly little advice as to how such party systems may be encouraged or promoted. There are 
several reasons for this. 
First, parties have typically been viewed as social phenomena beyond the scope of deliberate 
institutional design. Because political parties in theory represent the political expression of underlying 
societal cleavages, parties and party systems have not usually been thought amenable to overt political 
engineering.23. While some authoritarian states have attempted to control the development of their 
party systems (e.g. the mandated ‘two-party’ or ‘three-party’ systems that existed under military rule 
in Nigeria and Indonesia, or the ‘no-party’ system recently abandoned in Uganda), most democracies 
allow parties to develop relatively freely. Because of this, parties have until recently remained beyond 
the reach of formal political engineering in most circumstances. 
The role of international actors and development aid agencies is also important. While it is today 
widely accepted that stable democracy requires the development of a stable party system, there had in 
the past been resistance to the idea of direct international assistance to parties. Until recently, broader 
democracy and governance initiatives funded by development aid agencies often steered clear of 
working with parties, in part because of the overtly ‘political’ nature of such work, and also because 
aid agencies were often more comfortable dealing with civil society. But there has been a 
considerable shift in international practice in the past decade, with more and more governments and 
international organisations including political party strengthening in their development assistance 
programs.24 
If we know that they are desirable, the next question must surely be how stable and aggregative 
parties and party systems can be encouraged to develop. Clearly, forging a cohesive party system, 
particularly in societies riven by deep communal cleavages, is easier said than done. Nonetheless, 
domestic attempts to influence the development of parties via various kinds of institutional design 
have become relatively common in new democracies. The following section examines some of these 




Institutional Choices and Political Party Development 
The most common means of influencing party system development in conflict-prone societies is to 
introduce regulations which govern their formation, registration and behaviour. Such regulations may 
require parties to demonstrate a cross-regional or nation-wide composition as a pre-condition for 
competing in elections. Some of the world's most important transitional states have introduced such 
measures in recent years. In Turkey, for example, parties must establish regional branches, hold 
regular conventions and field candidates in at least half of all provinces to be eligible to contest 
national elections. In Russia, one of Putin's first reforms required political parties to register regional 
branches in a majority of Russia's 89 regions. Nigeria, in a move followed by many other African 
countries, requires parties to display a ‘federal character’, and regularly bans parties that fail to meet 
this criterion.25. In Indonesia, the world's most populous emerging democracy and largest Muslim 
country, parties must establish an organisational network in two-thirds of the provinces across the 
archipelago, and in two-thirds of the municipalities within those provinces, before they can compete 
in elections, although with some exceptions.26. Such devices raise the costs of party organisation, 
erecting a steep barrier to any potential new entrants. 
What is the effect of such schemes? The evidence to date is somewhat ambiguous, pointing to the 
utility of such mechanisms in achieving some goals – such as a more consolidated party system – but 
also their propensity for unintended consequences. Indonesia's mixture of regional (in Aceh) and 
national parties has worked relatively well, highlighting the reality that regional autonomy requires 
local electors to be able to vote for local parties. Johanna Birnir's analysis of Latin America's cross-
regional party registration rules found that nationally oriented parties often prospered at the expense 
of those representing geographically concentrated indigenous groups, suggesting that the exclusionary 
effects of such rules may outweigh any gains that result from reduction in party fragmentation27.  In 
Africa, the most comprehensive study of this issue yet conducted found few clear impacts of ethnic 
party bans on either peace or democracy28. In both regions, the claims that party engineering could 
promote better governance outcomes were found wanting. 
In Asia, by contrast, party regulation appears to have been much more consequential.29. I have argued 
previously that political party engineering in Asia and the Pacific has helped to consolidate party 
systems and promote a degree of conflict management, but in doing so has also assisted larger 
incumbent parties at the expense of minority interests.30. In Indonesia, for instance, new party rules 
have deterred the emergence of ethno-regional parties and limited opportunities for secessionism and 
ethnic conflict. As Aspinall has noted, 
In Indonesia, the decision early in the democratic transition to disallow local 
political parties from contesting elections was, it now appears in retrospect, highly 
consequential. It meant that the elevated levels of ethnic identification in politics 
that accompanied the transition were not crystallised, captured, and perpetuated in 
political movements that themselves sought to seek state power. At the very least, 
the decision placed an additional layer of brokerage and negotiation between 
ethnic leaders and state institutions. Indonesia's national political parties, though 
derided as poorly institutionalised vehicles of oligarchic interest, have proven 
remarkably adept at encouraging cross-ethnic bargaining and in minimising the 
role of ethnicity in politics.31.  
Despite its apparent success, the Indonesian experience has not so far inspired much in the way of 
emulation. One reason may be the heavy-handed nature of such reforms, which necessarily impinge 
on political freedom. In one sign of this, Fiji's military government recently issued a decree requiring 
parties to recruit at least 5000 registered members divided between the country's four geographic 
divisions, a move which may force some degree of multiethnic behaviour but which also raises huge 
barriers to democracy, requiring parties to enlist almost 10 per cent of the country's population as 
registered members.32 
Nonetheless, an increasing number of new democracies, particularly in post-conflict societies, have 
attempted to shape the development of their party system by other means. One approach is to 
encourage multi-ethnicity within parties by deliberately manipulating the ethnic composition of 
candidate lists, as in South Africa. In some countries, this has been taken further to include a 
legislative requirement for multi-ethnicity that would have been unlikely to develop otherwise. In 
Singapore, for example, all parties contesting the 15 ‘Group Representation Constituencies’ must 
include a member of the Malay, Indian or some other minority community on their list, thus ensuring 
a (modest) degree of multi-ethnicity. A related approach has been used for some time in Lebanon, 
which requires a balance of different confessional groups in each electoral district, although there the 
ultimate composition of the party lists rests with the voters. Similarly, in Latin America, Nicaragua 
and Peruoblige parties open up space on their lists for indigenous candidates at local and, in some 
cases, national elections.33 
Another approach has been to use technical electoral barriers such as vote thresholds, which prevent 
the election of many small parties in parliament. Probably the most extreme application of this is in 
Turkey, where parties must attain at least 10 per cent of the national vote (and constituency-level 
thresholds also apply) before they can be represented in parliament, thus discriminating strongly 
against smaller parties, especially those with geographically concentrated support bases.34. Like the 
Indonesian rules, this raises the fixed costs for all parties and has led to some extreme vote distortions: 
at the 2002 election, so many smaller parties failed to clear the 10 per cent threshold that 46 per cent 
of all votes were effectively ‘wasted’.35. In Latin America, all countries bar Argentina and Brazil 
require parties to win a minimum share of the vote at parliamentary elections, ranging from 500 votes 
in Uruguay to 5 per cent of all votes in Ecuador.36. In Asia, electoral thresholds have become a source 
of increasing political dispute, with emerging democracies such as Thailand and Indonesia lifting 
thresholds as a means of deterring smaller parties.37 
Other, more complex electoral system innovations to counter party fractionalisation and encourage 
inter-party cooperation are possible. For instance, vote-pooling systems in which electors rank-order 
candidates, and in which votes are transferred according to these rankings, can have the effect of 
rewarding centrists over extremists and encouraging cross-party cooperation by making politicians 
from different parties reciprocally dependent on transfer votes from their rivals.38. Examples of such 
systems in conflict-prone societies include the single transferable vote system in Northern Ireland, and 
the alternative vote models adopted in both Fiji and Papua New Guinea (and also recommended for 
Tonga and the Solomon Islands) in recent years. While the success of such reforms has been mixed, in 
each case encouraging the development of a more aggregative party system was a primary goal.39 
A final option for promoting cross-ethnic parties is to introduce distribution requirements which 
require parties or candidates to garner specified support levels across different regions of a country, 
rather than just their own home base, in order to be elected. First introduced in Nigeria in 1979, 
distribution requirements have so far been applied to presidential elections in large, ethnically diverse 
states in order to ensure that winning candidates receive a sufficiently broad spread of votes, rather 
than drawing their support from a few regions only. Nigeria's rules, which require presidential 
candidates to win both a majority of the overall vote and at least 25 per cent in two-thirds of Nigeria's 
36 states have proved consequential. In 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan, a southerner, was re-
elected (in what was hailed as the cleanest presidential vote in the country's history) with more than a 
quarter of the vote in 31 states, with an impressive showing in the predominantly Muslim north. 
Similarly, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono easily surpassed Indonesia's cross-archipelago 
support floor of at least 20 per cent of the vote in half of all provinces at his landslide 2009 electoral 
victory. Both candidates were able to demonstrate cross-regional appeal in what are very diverse and 
at times conflict-prone societies. 
 
Party-building and international practice 
In contrast to these kinds of devices, elections in which the international community is heavily 
involved – particularly those conducted under United Nations auspices – display few if any such 
incentives for political aggregation. Instead, they tend to favour simple models of proportional 
representation and unconstrained party formation, a combination which facilitates minority inclusion 
but poses major challenges for post-conflict governance. Virtually all the major post-conflict elections 
since the end of the Cold War – including Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), 
South Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), Liberia (1997), Bosnia (1996), Kosovo (2001), East Timor 
(2001), Iraq (2005), Burundi (2005), Rwanda (2008) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006) – 
have used some form of party-list proportional representation (PR), sometimes with the entire country 
forming a single electoral district. This model has some very clear advantages and disadvantages. One 
the one hand, PR can play an important role in ensuring inclusion and sharing of power between 
different groups once in government. On the other hand, because large-district PR systems allow both 
minority and majority parties to form and compete freely, they often feature parties which are 
ethnically based or thinly veiled versions of former warring armies. 
But, irrespective of these political strengths and weaknesses, in practice the adoption of PR systems 
for UN-administered elections has frequently been dictated more by technical concerns, such as the 
desire to avoid demarcating individual electoral districts and producing separate ballot papers, than 
deeper issues of political development. In war-torn environments, national PR systems are sometimes 
argued to be the only feasible way to hold credible elections. The reasons for this are essentially 
administrative in nature: national party-list systems enable a uniform national ballot to be used, do not 
require electoral districts to be demarcated and greatly simplify the process of voter registration, vote 
counting and the calculation of results. Problems of population displacement and the lack of accurate 
census data also work in favour of a proportional system with a single national constituency which 
does not tie voters to specific electoral districts.40.  
The problem with this approach is that such systems also have very specific political effects, 
particularly on a country's emerging party system. As one recent survey noted, nationwide PR is ‘the 
most permissive system … politicians can join small parties, establish new ones, or split an existing 
one, safe in the knowledge that even a small percentage of the votes will bring some seats in the 
legislative assembly. For the same reason, voters feel safe to vote for such parties, and their votes 
make the minimal success of small parties a sort of self-fulfilling expectation’.41. The result is often a 
fragmentation of existing parties and a multiplication of many smaller ones, particularly in the kind of 
fragmented conditions common to post-conflict societies. 
Compounding this problem, large-district PR systems necessarily provide little geographic link 
between voters and their representatives, creating problems of political accountability and 
responsiveness. Many new democracies – particularly those in agrarian societies – have much higher 
demands for constituency service at the local level than they do for representation of all shades of 
ideological opinion in the legislature.42. Yet, most PR systems undercut incentives for local 
representation and service delivery. Finally, as already discussed, highly proportional systems, such as 
that used at Iraq's transitional 2005 election, tend to encourage political fractionalisation rather than 
aggregation. 
In Iraq, for this reason, international experts initially favoured an electoral system based around 
provincial boundaries. However, this would have entailed a lengthy national census. In the interests of 
time, it was therefore decided to fall back on a single, nationwide district elected by PR in which 
1/275th of the vote was sufficient to gain a seat. While this doubtlessly facilitated the administration 
of the election itself, it also had the effect of fragmenting the legislature, marginalising numerically 
smaller groups such as the Sunni and doing nothing to prevent ethnic polarisation amongst the 
electorate. When combined with a presidential and quasi-federal system of government, the result was 
a proliferation of political veto-points which quickly led to deep problems of governability (stalemate, 
instability and balkanisation) and public policy (rent seeking, regional inequality and lack of public 
goods delivery) – all familiar and indeed predictable outcomes according to the political science 
literature.43 
In 2010, this system was replaced by a regional PR model along the lines of that initially 
recommended by external experts, enabling the resurgence of a nominally non-sectarian political 
party, Iraqiya, which included many Sunni politicians.44. But by then, the die had been largely cast: 
most parties remained tied to ethnic and religious identities, with the Sunni-Shi'ite division the key 
political cleavage in Iraqi electoral politics. Compounding this problem was the powersharing 
arrangement between Iraq's two largest parties signed under US pressure in 2010, which rapidly 
degenerated into a bitter stand-off between the country's two most powerful politicians, prime 
minister Nuri al-Maliki and the leader of the Iraqiya bloc, Ayad Allawi. There is now a growing 
realisation that this ethicised political system was a repeat of mistakes made by US negotiators in 
Bosnia and elsewhere.45. To quote Paul Salem of the Carnegie Endowment: 
 
Because the U.S. is not familiar with deeply divided societies and is not familiar 
with power-sharing systems, I would say, it made many grave mistakes and made 
the situation much worse. In other words even in implementing a power-sharing 
system it didn't do it all the way and it didn't do it properly’.46.  
In cases of international intervention, perhaps the worst decision in recent years was the choice of the 
single non-transferable vote (SNTV) for parliamentary elections in Afghanistan. Under SNTV, each 
elector has one vote, there are multiple seats to be elected and the candidates with the highest number 
of votes fill these positions. As a result, the number of candidates a party nominates becomes a critical 
choice: too few, and parties miss out on valuable chances to pick up additional seats; too many, and 
they risk splitting their vote too thinly and losing winnable seats. By forcing candidates from the same 
party to compete against each other for the same pool of voters, SNTV encourages personalistic 
attributes to be emphasised over and above those of party identification. While Afghanistan's weak 
and fragmented parliament probably suits the interests of President Karzai, these pathologies also 
undercut the goal of building a stronger political system and encouraging cohesive national 
development. In a clan-based society such as Afghanistan, SNTV has made it much harder for a 
consolidated party system to develop.47 
These examples suggest that successful transitional elections need to encourage both inclusion but 
also a significant degree of geographic and personal accountability – such as by having members of 
parliament represent territorially defined districts, or at least by allowing voters to choose between 
candidates and not just parties. For this reason, ‘mixed’ systems which deliver both district 
accountability and minority representation have become increasingly popular in recent years. 
However, as the experience in 2006 of high-profile conflict-zone elections held under mixed systems 
in cases as varied as the Democratic Republic of Congo (which resulted in a highly fragmented 
parliament) and the Palestinian National Authority (in which the system was designed to favour the 
incumbent Fatah party but instead resulted in a victory for Hammas) indicates, there are no panaceas. 
Despite this, most post-conflict political settlements give the responsibility for such choices to parties 
rather than to voters, approximating the classic consociational models of European social 
democracies.48. This tendency has buttressed the normative preferences of the United Nations and 
major donors for more inclusive political systems, evidenced by increasingly overt international 
attempts to increase the prospects of under-represented groups. Gender quotas are perhaps the best 
known example, either via reserved positions or formal party quotas for female candidates, both of 
which have become increasingly common in recent years. Countries as varied as Argentina, Bosnia, 
Costa Rica, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa and Uganda have all dramatically increased their 
proportion of female parliamentarians via such methods.49. In a similar vein, a small but growing 
number of post-conflict states are also pre-assigning seats for ethnic minorities either on party lists (as 
in the cases of Nigeria, Peru, Singapore mentioned earlier) or via reserved seats in parliament (as in 
Iraq, Bosnia, Lebanon and Kosovo), although the former approach remains less common than the 
latter.50 
However, the unhappy experience of government formation in these and other examples of 
communally structured political systems highlights a major problem: their tendency to become less 
and less governable, as the key aggregation functions of political parties are downplayed in favour of 
other normative goals such as inclusion and minority representation. Particularly in post-conflict 
societies, where the need to ensure that all key actors and groups involved in a conflict are represented 
in any political settlement is paramount, such concerns are easy to understand. But while 
understandable, it is becoming increasingly apparent that privileging representativeness over 
governability has led to perverse outcomes in a number of contemporary cases of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. 
Consider, for example, the ongoing constitutional reform process in Nepal. Since 2006, following the 
collapse of the country's monarchy and a low-level civil war between Maoist rebels and a discredited 
government, the United Nations and other international donors have supported Nepal's constitutional 
reform process in the hope that it will produce a stable democratic system in what is a very poor, 
mountainous and diverse country. A key achievement to date has been the election of a very large and 
disparate Constitutional Assembly, whose membership is explicitly designed to represent the full 
diversity of Nepalese society, in contrast to the closed, elite-dominated politics of the past. 
However, this highly inclusive process has made actually reaching agreement on a new constitution 
exceptionally slow and difficult, while highlighting the competing agendas of elected members and 
international donors. The country was without a Prime Minister for most of 2010, and at the time of 
writing it remains without a final constitution following the collapse of the Assembly in 2012. While 
the Maoists and some of the larger parties represented in the Assembly pushed for a constitution 
which emphasises unicameral majority rule and clear authority for the government, these priorities get 
short shrift from the donors, who have repeatedly called for greater attention to regionalism, gender 
balance, minority representation and the inclusion of civil society.51 
While these are all significant issues, it could be argued that none are as important for a poor country 
such as Nepal as providing the basis for strong and effective government. Indeed, in different ways, 
each could be seen as undermining this goal. Regional devolution or federalism can have the effect of 
fragmenting already weak states, especially given plans for ethnically based state units.52. The 
preoccupation with descriptive representation of women and indigenous groups in the constitutional 
building process is at odds with the need to aggregate basic social cleavages of gender and ethnicity 
into effective parties. The prioritising of civil society could also have the perverse effect of 
undercutting efforts at party-building. Indeed, if donor wishes are followed, Nepal could end up with 
a system in which sectoral and minority representation is so privileged that it becomes almost 
impossible to govern. As one sign of this crisis of governability, on 28 May 2012, Nepal's Constituent 
Assembly ended its tenure, for the third and possibly final time, without having completed even a first 
draft of the constitution. 
The recent history of Iraq gives another example of the kind of impasse which can be created when an 
array of ethno-religious parties need to arrive at a consensus to enshrine a new government: simply 
put, they do not. Today, some local observers argue that Iraq is veering towards a ‘Lebanonisation’ of 
its political system, with power permanently distributed along strict ethnic and sectarian lines. For two 
governments in a row, the posts of president, premier and parliament speaker have been parcelled out 
to a Kurd, a Shiite and a Sunni, all with deputies drawn from the other two groups, a practice that now 
appears to have spilled over into civil service appointments and the security forces.53.  
Unsurprisingly, this sectarianisation of politics has led to acute political sclerosis. In October 2010, 
Iraq set what the Washington Post claimed was a new record for the county that had gone longest 
between holding parliamentary elections and forming a government, at over 208 days without a 
government.54. The eventual formation of a powersharing government, under heavy US pressure, did 
little to solve the underlying problems of mistrust, as key parties repeatedly broke prior commitments 
to cooperate. Today, Iraq's government remains effectively paralysed, with analyst Kenneth M. 
Pollack noting that the national unity government ‘took all of Iraq's political problems and put them 
into the government… There is widespread recognition now among American officials that 
inclusiveness over effectiveness was a mistake’.55 
The consequences of privileging inclusiveness over effectiveness can be seen in several other cases of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Burundi – a recipient of much international donor attention – represents 
perhaps the apotheosis of this trend, with its parliament and other state agencies now constituted 
according to a fundamental 60/40 ethnic ratio between Hutu and Tutsi. Presidential candidates need a 
group of 200 qualified supporters reflecting ‘ethnic and gender components’ to support their 
nomination. Similarly, the country's two vice-presidents must hail from distinct ethnic backgrounds 
and party affiliations, while representing the dominant ethnic group within their party. For parliament 
to pass laws, a two-thirds majority (necessitating Tutsi votes, and thus a possible minority veto) is in 
place. Government formation is via a rigid model of mandated powersharing in which all parties 
obtaining more than 5 per cent of the vote are guaranteed ministerial positions, again with a fixed 
60:40 Hutu–Tutsi composition. Similar provisions govern the make-up of the country's civil service, 
security forces and justice system (which also includes regional and gender equity requirements), as 
well as territorial powersharing. As Lemarchand has noted, ‘No other state anywhere in the continent 
offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity’56. But, it is also a recipe for extreme 




Building aggregative parties in post-conflict environments is fraught with problems. Even with the 
best will in the world, it has often proved impossible for party-builders to construct multiethnic 
parties. Difficult trade-offs are ever-present, not least the collective action problems created when 
internal party leaders attempt to balance the need for party cohesion and unity with the need to appeal 
to a broad swathe of the electorate. Parties need to form around whichever issues are salient, and in 
war-torn societies it is hard to escape the logic pushing parties to follow ‘conflict’ cleavages, be they 
inter-ethnic, inter-religious or inter-regional. 
But, international actors can help or hinder this process. I believe that the preference for hyper-
representative political architecture in some of the most prominent cases of post-conflict 
peacebuilding is a retrograde development. This trend has been encouraged to a significant degree by 
the United Nations and international donor agencies, and by elite concerns with issues of social 
exclusion, descriptive representation of women and minorities, and political representation more 
generally. While the normative preference of the international aid industry for inclusion and 
representation of all groups, especially women, is a laudable goal, it is less defensible when used as a 
donor-driven ‘natural experiment’ conducted upon aid-dependent new democracies. In addition to 
creating huge problems of day-to-day governance, this model risks producing a generation of weak 
polities and parties which are unable to take even routine political decisions, let alone difficult ones. 
The implications of this paper therefore argue for a shift in international priorities in post-conflict 
democracy-building towards placing issues of effective governance and economic development at the 
forefront when decisions on political institutions and parties are taken. But what would such a pro-
development representative democracy look like? The comparative literature suggests several 
desirable characteristics in terms of party politics. 
First, post-conflict societies require political stability – both in terms of regime type and in terms of 
parties. While too much stability is the death knell of democracy, a more common problem in many 
emerging democracies is actually the reverse – what Tom Carothers has called ‘feckless pluralism’, in 
which relatively free and fair elections result only in the alternation of power between corrupt, self-
interested and ineffective political party elites who ‘seem only to trade the country's problems back 
and forth from one hapless side to the other’.57. To counter this, well-institutionalised political parties 
with clear policy platforms are key, not least because of the quest for credible commitments. 
However, party institutionalisation in new democracies remains an elusive goal.58 
In terms of party systems, a relatively small number of broad-based, programmatic parties in which 
competition over the generation of public goods takes precedence over all other issues, need to be 
fostered and sustained. The natural tendency in post-conflict settings for a profusion of new parties 
representing different social cleavages should not be further exacerbated by permissive electoral laws. 
Rather, international assistance should aim to foster a few large, inclusive parties with a broad support 
base which deliberately cut across, rather than reinforce, existing social cleavages. 
And finally, as a complement to this focus on developing a small number of broad-based, 
programmatic parties, there should be much less focus from external assistance on promoting 
descriptive representation and minority rights than is accorded in both democratic theory and donor 
practice. Rather, promoting ‘bridging’ parties which aggregate diverse social cleavages should take 
precedence over other goals aimed at maximising the representation of all interests, worthy though 
these may be. 
As should now be clear, there is a clear tension between these recommendations and the typical 
concerns of aid donor agencies and international organisations. While the comparative experience 
strongly suggests that programmatic, aggregative and institutionalised parties offer major benefits for 
all democracies, this is even more important in post-conflict ones. But, when it comes to international 
efforts at party-building in post-conflict democracies, these objectives often in practice take a back 
seat to more immediate concerns about administrative convenience, descriptive representation and 
tokenism. Unsurprisingly, the result has been immobilised parliaments, fragmented parties and 
chronically unstable governments. 
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